Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verification (Confirmation): In science, a confirmation refers to empirical evidence or experimental results that support a hypothesis or theory, reinforcing its validity or accuracy. Anyway theories remain open to revision based on new evidence or observations. See also Theories, Hypotheses, Experiments, Method, Verification, Certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Verification (Confirmation) - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 44 Verification/Peirce: confirmation relations are ipso facto semantical. QuineVs: evidence is not semantic otherwise it would be a priori. >Evidence. IV 50 Verification/verification conditions/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine-Duhem thesis: verification conditions are a posteriori. >Quine-Duhem thesis. Verification is a question of scientific discovery what confirms what (not a matter of meaning). >Discoveries. Problem: if then the confirmation relations are revisable and meaning depends on verification, then statements cannot have their meanings essentially. Then statements cannot be formulas + semantic assessment. >Statements._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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